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REPARATION AWARDS TO VICTIMS OF
CRIMES IN OHIO
INTRODUCTION
T HE CONCEPT OF compensation for victims of crime through publicly
funded programs is of fairly recent origin.' Programs were developed
in New Zealand and Great Britain in the early sixties, followed by pro-
grams in the United States in California and New York.2 Now approximate-
ly twenty states have such programs and there is one under consideration
in the United States Congress.'
Some of the reasons cited supporting the creation of criminal in-
jury programs are:
1. Society has defaulted on its obligation to protect the individual
and therefore has a duty to compensate him for his injury.'
2. Incarcerating the criminal effectively deprives the victim of his
tort remedy against the criminal.'
3. The state has directed its expenditures towards aiding and rehabili-
tating the criminal not towards the victim.!
4. The state has a moral obligation to help the victims of violent
crime.8
5. It is sufficient justification in a democracy to characterize such
programs as a response to a societal need.'
'Harland, Compensating Victims of Crime, 14 CluM. L. BULL. 203, 204 (1978).
2 d.
8 ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.67.010-.175 (Michie 1974 and Michie Cum. Supp. 1978); CAL. GOV'T
CoDE§§ 13959-13969.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1979);DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9001-9017 (Michie
Cum. Supp. 1978); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 351-1 to -70 (1976); Crime Victims Compensation
Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, H3 71-84 (West Supp. 1978); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 346.010-
.180 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, §§ 1-17 (Michie 1973 and Michie
Cum. Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258A, §§ 1-8 (West Cum. Supp. 1979);
MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 18.351-.368 (West Supp. 1967-1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
299B.01-.16 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 217.010-.350 (1977); NJ. STAT.
ANN. §§ 52:4B-1 to -20 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980); N.Y. ExEc. LAw §§ 620-635 (Mc-
Kinney 1972 and McKinney Supp. 1972-1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-13-01 to -20 (Smith
Supp. 1977); OaIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.51-.72 (Page Supp. 1978); 71 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 180-7 to -7.16 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3501
to -3517 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1978); VA. CODE §§ 19.2-368.1 to .18 (Michie
Cune. Supp. 1979); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 7.68.010 to .910 (West Supp. 1978);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 949.01 to .18 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
'H.R. 99, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 1899, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R.
1961, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 190, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
5 Brooks, The Case for Creating Compensation Programs to Aid Victims of Violent Crimes,
11 TuLsA L.J. 477, 479 (1977).
018d. at 480. See also: McAdam, Emerging Issue: An Analysis of Victim Compensation in
America, 8 UPs. L. 346, 347 (1977).
?Brooks, supra note 5, at 359.
8 Id. at 483.
9 Id. at 485.
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6. Allowing recovery only if there has been a showing of cooperation
with the police, will improve crime detection, since more crimes
will be reported.10
7. Allowing recovery to "good samaritans" who are injured in at-
tempting to prevent crimes will encourage citizens to participate
in fighting crime.1
Whatever rationale is propounded, it seems clear that state legislatures
are responding to a belief that the traditional remedies of tort recovery, in-
surance, and restitution12 are not adequate, and some kind of state funded
program is required.
Ohio has taken steps to assist victims of crime by enacting Revised Code
sections 2743.51-.72.1 It is the purpose of this comment to review the pro-
visions of the Ohio law, comparing it with the statutes of other states and
making a preliminary assessment of its impact, strengths, and weaknesses,
based on approximately two years of experience with the law in its present
form. Comparison will be made with the provisions of the Uniform Crime
Victims Reparation Act, drafted and approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1973.14
II. COMPARATIVE STUDY
A. Administration
The Ohio provision for reparation awards to victims of crimes is ad-
ministered through the Court of Claims, the Court of Claims Commission-
ers and the State Attorney General's office. The Court of Claims came into
existence January 1, 1975, and is a court of limited subject matter juris-
diction."
1o McAdam, supra note 6, at 359.
11 Id.
12 "For tort recovery, the criminal must be caught and his resources in prison are frequently
not adequate to support payment of a judgment or restitution. Those who need insurance
are the least likely to be able to afford to carry it." Id. at 347-49.
'3 Am. Sub. H.B. 800 created the Court of Claims and waived the sovereign immunity of
the State of Ohio, effective January 1, 1975. Am. Sub. H.B. 185, effective January 1, 1975,
created a new cause of action for persons killed or injured while helping victims of crime,
assisting a police officer or apprehending a criminal. This was repealed by Sub. H.B. 82,
effective September 29, 1976, which also repealed the aiders of crime provisions and
created the system for an award of reparations to victims of criminally injurious conduct.
Am. Sub. H.B. 149 effective February 7, 1978, amended the reparations awards provisions.
Am. Sub. Sen. Bill 119 effective August 30, 1978 requires all judges having criminal orjuvenile jurisdiction to inform victims of the victims' right to file a reparations application.
14 Rothstein, How the Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act Works, 60 A.B.A.J. 1531
(1974).
'1 The Court of Claims is a court of record and has exclusive, original jurisdiction of all
civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of immunity contained in Section
2743.02 of the Revised Code, exclusive jurisdiction of the causes of action of all parties
in civil actions that are removed to the Court of Claims and of determinations pursuant
to Sections 5315.04 and 5315.05 of the Revised Code, and jurisdiction to hear appeals
from the Court of Claims Commissioners.
Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2743.03 (Page Supp. 1978).
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Most states have set up new administrative mechanisms for their vic-
tims' compensation programs, but some states, such as North Dakota,"
Virginia, 7 Wisconsin, 18 and Washington, 9 use previously existing admini-
strative departments or commissions with judicial review through regular ad-
ministrative procedures and court mechanisms. Tennessee"0 uses its circuit
courts, mandating that no judge may preside in a claims hearing, and at a
criminal or civil trial involving the same crime."
The Uniform Act22 prefers a special board rather than a Workmen's
Compensation Board or a court.
B. Claims
a. Compensable Injuries
In Ohio, claims are allowed for "economic loss" resulting from "crim-
inally injurious conduct,"2 which is defined as conduct occurring in the
state which poses a substantial threat of personal injury or death and is pun-
ishable by fine, imprisonment or death, or would be so punishable except
that the person acting lacked the capacity to commit the crime under the
laws of the state. 4 It does not include injuries caused by a motor vehicle
unless there was an intent to cause injury or death. 5
California," Kentucky, 7  Maryland,"8  Massachusetts, 2 9 Michigan,' °
Minnesota," New York," Nevada," North Dakota,' Pennsylvania," Tenn-
essee,3" Virginia,"' and Washington 8 have similar provisions. However,
Is N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-13-03 (Smith Supp. 1977) "Workmen's Compensation Bureau".
'7 VA. CODE § 19.2-368.2 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1979) "Industrial Commission of Virginia."
18 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.02 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) "Dept. of Industry, Labor and
Human Relations".
'1 WASH. Rlv. CODE ANN. § 7.68.020 (West Supp. 1978) "Department of Labor and In-
dustries".
20TENN. CODE AN. § 23-5503 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1978).
211Id. at (b).
2Rothstein, supra note 14, at 1532.
23 Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 2743.52 (Page Supp. 1978).
241d. § 2743.51(c).
2Rd.
26 CAL. GoV'T CODE § 13960(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
2TAn Act relating to crime victims, ch. 213, § 2(3), 1978 Ky. Rev. Stat. & Rules Serv.
649 (Baldwin 1978) (to be codified as Ky. REV. STAT. § 346.020).
28 MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 2(c) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978).
29 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258A, § 1 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
30 MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.351, sec. 1(c), (West Supp. 1967-1979).
"1 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299B.01(5)(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
32N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 621 (McKinney 1972).
33 NEv. REv. STAT. § 217.035 (1977).
'
4 N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-13-03(4) (Smith Supp. 1977).
5 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 180-7 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
36 TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3504 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1978).
87 VA. CODE § 19.2-368.2 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1979).
88 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.68.020 (West Supp. 1978).
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Alaska,"9 Delaware, ° Illinois," and New Jersey 2 adopt the approach of
listing specific crimes for which resulting injury is compensable.
The Uniform Act uses the same definition as the Ohio Act, based on
the rationale that it is difficult to predict every crime that might give rise
to personal injury. 3
There are substantial variations in the kinds of losses for which victims
are compensated. The Ohio Act provides awards of reparations for "eco-
nomic loss"" which is defined as "economic detriment consisting only of al-
lowable expense, work loss, and replacement services loss. '4 5 If death is
caused, economic loss includes a dependent's economic loss and a depend-
ent's replacement services loss." No direct compensation is allowed for pain
and suffering or physical impairment but only for economic loss which they
might cause." "Work loss" is loss of income from work the victim would
have performed if he had not been injured, expenses incurred by him to
obtain services he would have performed for income, less any income from
work he did or might reasonably have undertaken.' "Replacement services"
means expenses incurred in obtaining services the injured might have per-
formed for himself or his family if he had not been injured."' Included under
"allowable expense" are medical care, rehabilitation, and an amount up to
$500 for burial expenses." All funds available to the victim from collateral
sources, such as insurance, social security, workmen's compensation and
wage continuation are subject to the state's subrogation if an award is made.5
There is no specific mention of pregnancy as a result of rape, and it does
not seem that this kind of damage would be encompassed by the term "per-
sonal injury or death" in the definition of criminally injurious conduct.
The California statute12 provides that a local government agency shall
provide funds for examination of sexual assault victims for the purpose of
gathering evidence, but makes no mention of pregnancy. The Delaware,"
89 ALASKA STAT. § 18.67-100 (Michie 1974).
4 0 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9002(3) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978).
41 Crime Victims Compensation Act § 2, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 72(c) (West Supp.
1978).
42 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-11 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
'4 Rothstein, supra note 14, at 1531.
4Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.52 (Page Supp. 1978).
45 1d. § 2743.51(E).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at (G).
49 ld. at (H).
50ld. at (F).
15 Id. § 2743.72.
52 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13961.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
53 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9002(7) (Michie Cure. Supp. 1978).
[Vol. 13:1
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New Jersey, " Virginia,5 and Wisconsin' statutes specifically provide for
compensation for the costs of pregnancy resulting from rape. Illinois"7 ex-
cludes child support payments for a child conceived as a result of rape. Ne-
vada" has a provision for treatment at county expense for the victim and
spouse of a victim of sexual assault contingent upon the filing of a criminal
complaint against the alleged offender. Tennessee provides for an award
for pain and suffering only to "victims of the crime of rape and victims of
crime involving sexual deviancy." It would seem that the failure to address
the problem of the costs of pregnancy resulting from rape is a substantial
lack in the Ohio law.
Most states do not allow compensation for pain and suffering, although
Delaware" allows compensation for mental and nervous shock, and New
York6 provides for payment for counseling services for those suffering trau-
matic shock.
The Uniform Act does not allow compensation for pain and suffering
and other non-pecuniary loss, based on a rationale of allowing more peo-
ple to be at least partly compensated. Also, unlike no-fault insurance, the
act preserves the victim's private rights against the offender.
6 1
b. Eligibility
In Ohio, the "victim" is defined as a person who suffers personal injury
or death as a result of criminally injurious conduct, the good faith effort of
any person to prevent criminally injurious conduct, or the good faith effort
of any person to apprehend someone suspected of engaging in criminally in-
jurious conduct." The "any person" presumably includes the victim himself,
though the language is not clear. That is, it is not clear whether a person
who is injured or killed trying to prevent the criminally injurious conduct
or trying to apprehend a person suspected of engaging in criminally injurious
conduct would be considered a victim or whether the victim would have to
be some other person injured as a result of these efforts. Since this section
54 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-2 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
55VA. CODE § 19.2-368.11 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1979).
56Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.01(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
57 Crime Victims Compensation Act § 4, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 74 (West Supp. 1978).
58 NEv. REv. STAT. § 217.310 (1977).
5 9 TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3506(c) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1978).
60 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9002(7) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978).
61N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 623(10) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1978).
62 Rothstein, supra note 14, at 1532.
63 Id.
ad Omo Rv. CODE ANN. § 2743.51 (Page Supp. 1978).
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replaces the old "aiders in case of crime" provisions, 5 the intent of the
statute seems to be to include the aiders themselves. Police and corrections
officers are not excluded under this section.
All states except Massachusetts and New York have similar "aiders"
provisions and most states do not specifically exclude police officers as vic-
tims. However, many have statutes similar to that of Tennessee, 6 which de-
fines a victim as a "person who suffers personal injury or death as a direct
and proximate result of any act" falling within the enumeration of
the crimes. This would seem not to include a police officer in the perform-
ance of his duties. Illinois covers persons who assist victims only if such as-
sistance "would be expected of a reasonable man under the circumstances,"
and those who aid a police officer only "if the assistance was in response to
the express request of the law enforcement official."67 Virginia68 specifically
excepts a law officer in the performance of his duties from the aider pro-
vision.
Ohio 9 provides that no award be given to an offender or his accom-
plice, and allows an award to the spouse or any person living in the same
household with the offender or his accomplice or to the parent, child, bro-
ther, or sister of the offender or his accomplice only if "a determination is
made that the interests of justice require that an award be made.""°
Most states flatly deny an award to such persons, although California
and Delaware do not make such an exception.
The Uniform Reparations Act7' takes the approach that all claims
should be scrutinized for fraud, collusion and gain to the offender, but that
claims should be allowed for members of the offender's household if the in-
terests of justice so require.
Ohio"2 also provides that a claim may be denied if the victim has not
cooperated with law enforcement agencies. This provision would further one
of the reasons advanced to support the enactment of such laws: the improve-
ment of law enforcement and crime detection.
65 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2743.31-.35, amended and renumbered 2743.51, 2743.52 by Sub.
H.B. 82, effective September 29, 1976. The former sections created a new cause of action for
aiders to victims of crime. The sections did not apply to victims of crime but applied to
persons injured or killed while rendering assistance to victims of crime, assisting a police
officer or apprehending a criminal. The maximum award allowed was $10,000.
G6 TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3502(i) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1978).
67 Crime Victims Compensation Act, § 2, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 72 (West Supp. 1978).
8 VA. CODE § 19.2-368.4A.3 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1979).
69 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
TOId.
71 Rothstein, supra note 14, at 1533.
12 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(C) (Page Supp. 1978).
(Vol. 13:1
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California,73 Delaware,"' Illinois," and Minnesota"8 are among the
states that have similar provisions. Additionally, some states, like Ohio,"
including Alaska,"8 California,"9 Hawaii,8" Illinois,8' Nevada," New Jersey,"
and Pennsylvania" require a determination as to whether the victim con-
tributed by his own behavior to the infliction of the injury, the award to be
reduced or denied on the basis of such determination. Other states" require
that the victim's financial means be taken into consideration in deciding the
award.
The Uniform Act recommends against considering financial means,
both because of the additional administrative work involved in making such
an investigation, and because it is felt that economizing can be attained more
easily by limiting the elements of compensable damage and by placing a
ceiling on awards.8
Residency requirements vary from state to state. Ohio requires that
the criminally injurious conduct occur within the state, 7 but does not require
that the victim be a state resident.
Alaska and New Jersey have no residency requirements at all, so pre-
sumably a nonresident would be covered if injured by a crime within the
state, and a resident, if injured by a crime which occurred outside the state.
California88 provides such coverage for a resident who was injured or killed
while temporarily outside the state. Pennsylvania 8 provides that if the vic-
78 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13964 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
74 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9006 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978).
75 Crime Victims Compensation Act § 3, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 73 (West Supp. 1978).
76 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299B.03(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
77 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(D) (Page Supp. 1978).
78AijsKA STAT. § 18.67.080(3)(C) (Michie 1974).
TO CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13964(a), (c) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
80 In determining whether to make an award under this section, the commissioner shall
consider the behavior of the victim, and whether, because of provocation or otherwise, the
victim bears any share of the responsibility for the crime that caused his injury or death
and the commission shall reduce the amount of compensation in accordance with its
assessment of the degree of such responsibility attributable to the victim.
HAW. REv. STAT. § 351.31(c) (1976).
81 Crime Victims Compensation Act § 7, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 77(c) (West Supp.
1978).
82 NEv. REv. STAT. § 217.220. sec. I(C) (1977).
83 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-10(C) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
84 71 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 180-7.9(f) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
85 MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 12(f) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 18.361 sec. 11(5), (West Supp. 1967-1979); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631-6 (McKinney 1972);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3507 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 19.2-368.13
(Michie Cum. Supp. 1979); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.06(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
80 Rothstein, supra note 14, at 1531.
87 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.51 (Page Supp. 1978).
88 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13961(a)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
89 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 180-7.3(4)(c) (Pardon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
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tim's state of residence allows payment to its residents injured in Pennsyl-
vania, then the victim's state of residence will have primary responsibility
for the payment.
If a nonresident is injured in a state such as Ohio which does not re-
quire residency as a condition for award, and his home state permits awards
for injuries which occur out of the state, which state would be primarily re-
sponsible for compensating the victim? While Ohio9" provides that an award
will be reduced by the amount readily available to the victim from collateral
sources, specifically mentioning "a state or any of its... subdivisions"'" as such
a source, it has not specifically addressed this problem. Pennsylvania 2 has
a statute providing that a nonresident of Pennsylvania shall be eligible for
such an award only if the victim's home state provides for compensation to
Pennsylvania residents who are victims of crime in that state.
Conceivably, in the absence of a provision like that of Pennsylvania,
there could be a dispute between states like California, Alaska and New
York which provide for awards for their own residents when injured while
out-of-state, and a state like Ohio, which presumably allows awards for out-
of-state residents injured by criminally injurious conduct which occurs with-
in the state.
A "claimant" in Ohio, that is, a person who may file a claim for an
award of reparations, is defined as: a victim; a dependent of a deceased vic-
tim; a third person other than a collateral source; a person who is authorized
to act on behalf of a victim; a dependent; or a third person who is not a
collateral source. 3 A "dependent" means an individual wholly or partially
dependent upon the victim for care and support including an after-born
child. The provision that a third person who is not a collateral source may
be a claimant is somewhat ambiguous. It is probably intended to cover a
parent or a minor child, but would this include, for example, a doctor or
hospital which provided care for a victim? There seems to be a potential
standing problem here, since it is unclear what kind of interest in the claim
a third person would be required to have in order to be a claimant under
the Ohio law.
Other states are more specific. Alaska9 5 allows an award to "a person
responsible or who had been responsible for the maintenance of the victim
who has suffered pecuniary loss or incurred expenses as a result of the injury
or death." Delaware96 provides that a relative, guardian or attorney may ap-
90Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.51(A)(4) (Page Supp. 1978).
9 Id. § 2743.51(B)(2).
9271 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 180-7.3(4)(c) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
93 Omo REv. CODE A~N .§ 2743.51(A) (Page Supp. 1978).
94Id. § 2743.51(D).
93 ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.080(2) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978).
9 6DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9002(5), 9007(a) (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978).
[Vol. 13:1
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ply on behalf of a person deemed by law to be incompetent. Michigan " al-
lows only a person eligible to receive an award or the parent or guardian of a
minor to file a claim. The persons eligible to receive an award are the victim
himself, a surviving spouse, parent, or child of a victim, or any person de-
pendent for his principal support upon a victim who died as a result of the
crime.98 North Dakota99 defines as claimants of the victim, a dependent of a
deceased victim or a representative of either. The Tennessee provision"0 is
similar to that of Alaska.
The "third person" provision in Ohio awaits judicial interpretation but
certainly raises problems of ambiguity.
c. Amount of Compensation
The Ohio statute0 ' provides for the award of attorney's fees to be de-
termined by the Court of Claims Commissioners, commensurate with ser-
vices rendered and to be paid in addition to the amount awarded to the
claimant. The statute also provides that attorney's fees may be denied upon
a finding that the claim or appeal was frivolous, but further provides that
attorney's fees may be awarded even if an award of reparations is not made.
The attorney fee provisions of the statutes of other states are various
in form. Illinois' provides that no fee may be charged an applicant for pre-
paring or presenting an application before the Court of Claims; a fee may
be charged for representing an applicant in a hearing but only in such an
amount as the Court of Claims determines to be reasonable. Massachusetts
makes no provision for attorney fees, nor does Michigan. The primary dif-
ference between the provisions for attorney's fees is that some states, such
as Hawaii,"' allow a percentage of the award to be paid out of the award,
while other states, such as New Jersey,"" allow up to a certain percentage
of the award, but to be paid in addition to the award.
The Ohio provision is potentially one of the most generous, since it
places no percentage ceiling on attorney's fees and pays in addition to the
award. Ohio and North Dakota0 5 are the only states that allow by statute
for an award of attorney's fees even if an award of reparations is not al-
lowed. Ohio0 8 also allows compensation for witnesses equal to that received
97 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.355, see. 5(1) (West Supp. 1967-1979).
981d. § 18.354, sec. 4(1).
99 N.D. CENT. CODE § 65.13.03(2) (Smith Supp. 1977).
10 0 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3505 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1978).
101 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.65 (Page Supp. 1978).
102 Crime Victims Compensation Act § 12, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 82 (West Supp. 1978).
103 HAw. REv. STAT. § 351-16 (1976) (up to fifteen percent).
104 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-8 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) (up to fifteen percent).
105 N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-13-13 (Smith Supp. 1977).
106 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.65(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
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by witnesses in civil cases. Hawaii" 7 is the only other state that allows wit-
ness fees.
Ohio's allowance of up to $50,000 per incident is the highest of all the
states." 8 Alaska l0 9 allows $25,000 per victim per incident, except in the case
of death of a victim who has more than one dependent when the total award
may not exceed $40,000. New York10 provides that there must be a mini-
mum loss of $100 or 2 weeks earnings, whichever is less, and provides a
maximum award of $20,000, unless federal funds are available to provide
a larger amount. Delaware, 1' New Jersey,"' and Illinois"3 provide a maxi-
mum of $10,000, and Kentucky." and Michigan,"' $15,000.
d. Payments from Collateral Sources
Ohio's statute, as do those of many states, provides that the state shall
be subrogated to the claimant's rights to recover from any collateral source
any benefits for economic loss for which an award of reparations was
made.'16 The statute also provides that the claimant may sue the offender
for any damages or injuries caused by the offender and not compensated
for by an award of reparations. Presumably, the wording of the statute
would not allow the claimant to sue for any amount for which an award
of reparations had been granted. The claimant may join with the Attorney
General as co-plaintiff in any action against the offender. Read together
with the definition of collateral source" 7 however, this provision might cause
some difficulty. Collateral source is defined as "a source of benefits or ad-
vantages for economic loss otherwise reparable that the victim has received,
or that is readily available to him" (emphasis added), including the of-
fender."'
Could an award of reparations be denied on the grounds that a claim-
ant could have sued the offender, based on the rationale that this was a
collateral source readily available to him? Could it be required that a claim-
ant would have to assess his chances of recovery from the offender as a pre-
requisite for filing for an award of reparations? If he failed to sue the of-
fender, filed a claim, and the statute of limitations had run on his cause
107 HAw. REV. STAT. § 351-13 (1976).
0 8 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.60(E) (Page Supp. 1978).
20 9 ALAsKA STAT. § 18.67.130 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978).
"10N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 631(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1978).
"' DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9007 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978).
112 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-18(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
113 Crime Victims Compensation Act § 7, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 77 (West Supp. 1978).
114 An Act relating to crime victims, ch. 213, § 1(5), 1978 Ky. Rev. Stat. & Rules Serv.
649 (Baldwin 1978) (to be codified as KY. REv. STAT. § 346.130).
215 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.361, sec. 11 (1) (West Supp. 1967-1979).
116 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.72 (Page Supp. 1978).
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of action against the offender before the decision was made on the award,
and the award was denied on the grounds that he could have sued the of-
fender as a collateral source, he could be precluded from any recovery for
his loss. The reparations application asks if medical or loss of income bene-
fits are available from any source other than under the Victims of Crime Act
and includes a box to be checked for the offender, so such an assessment
seems to be required.
A possible solution may lie in the provision of the act for reconsider-
ation of a claim."9 If the claim has not been dormant for five years, a claim-
ant to whom a reparation award was denied or whose award was minimal
because of potential recovery from a collateral source may reassert his
claim. 2 The claim becomes dormant when one of three eventualities occurs:
1. An objection to the award of a single commissioner is not made
before the time permitting objection has expired, or
2. An appeal is not made within the time permitted for appealing the
original determination of a panel of commissioners, or
3. The court journalizes its final order on an appeal from the de-
cision of a panel of commissioners. 2'
Seemingly this provision would provide a remedy if it was erroneously
determined that aid would be available from a collateral source, such as the
offender. It does not seem, however, to eliminate the problem involved in
assessing the possibility of recovering from the offender; that is, how, short
of filing suit against the offender, could it be determined that the offender
would not be a "collateral source readily available"'2 2 to the claimant? The
dormancy provision would seem also to provide cold comfort to aged vic-
tims or those whose needs might be immediate.
One final provision' might provide a partial answer to these prob-
lems. If a determination is made by a single commissioner or a panel of
commissioners that a claimant will suffer financial hardship unless a tenta-
tive award is made, and there is a likelihood that an award will be made,
it is provided that an amount may be paid. This amount will be deducted
from the final award or repaid to the extent the final award is exceeded.
Thus, if the amount available from collateral sources is difficult to ascertain
within a reasonable, time, some relief is available.
Alaska.'2 merely requires that if compensation is awarded and the per-
son receives a collateral sum, the Board may require that he refund it. The
119 Id. § 2743.68.
120 Id. § 2743.68(A).
21Id. § 2743.68(B).
1221d. § 2743.51(B).
123 Id. § 2743.67.
L24 ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.090 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978).
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Delaware"2 5 statute allows the state to institute action against the person
who committed the act resulting in injury or death for which compensation
is granted only when the person is convicted of the offense. It also pro-
vides ' that the award shall be the amount of pecuniary loss minus "the
amount claimant has or will receive as indemnification from any other
source." All of these provisions involve the problem of identifying the losses
for which collateral sources indemnify in order to decide what amount is
owed to the state, and allowing awards with subsequent restoration to the
state of amounts received from collateral sources would seem to present
enforcement problems.
The Uniform Act"' takes the approach that only collateral payments to
the claimant on elements of damage covered by a compensation award are
to be reimbursed and rules are provided for determining what losses are
covered by collateral payments.
Kentucky," s Massachusetts,'" and New York"' all have provisions that
any money owed to a criminal for a media representation of any aspect of
a crime for which the state has compensated a victim must be paid to the
state. The acts provide that the money paid to the victim will be deducted
from that amount and generally that the money will be held in escrow pend-
ing conviction, to be paid to any other victims of the crime."'
C. Reporting Requirements
The states have various requirements for reporting the injury to the
police and the time allowed for filing a claim. California and Delaware
make no requirements for time in which the injury must be reported to the
125 DL.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9010 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978).
2BSId. § 9005(1).
2T Rothstein, supra note 14, at 1532.
28 An Act relating to crime victims, ch. 297, § 1(1), 1978 Ky. Rev. Stat. & Rules Serv. 847
(Baldwin 1978) (to be codified as Ky. REv. STAT. § 346.165).
2" MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258-A, § 8 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
250 N.Y. Exnc. LAw § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1972-1978).
131 The Massachusetts statute reads:
§ 8 Proceeds received by criminals as result of commission of crime; distribution to
victims.
Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity con-
tracting with any person or the representative or assignee of any person, convicted of
a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of such crime, by way of a
movie, book, magazine article, radio or television presentation, live entertainment of
any kind, or from the expression of such person's thoughts, feelings, opinions, or
emotions regarding such crime, shall pay over to the state treasurer any moneys which
would otherwise, by terms of such contract, be owing to the person or his representa-
tives. The treasurer shall deposit such moneys in an escrow account for the benefit of
and payable to any victim of crimes committed by such person, provided such person
is eventually convicted of the crime and provided, further, that such victim withinthree years of the date of the crime, brings a civil action in a court of competent juris-
diction and recovers a money judgment against such person or his representatives.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 258-A, § 8 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
[Vol. 13:1
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police. Hawaii' 32 merely sets a "reasonable time." The other states include
New Jersey's 3I liberal requirement that the act be reported within three
months to the police, and, at the other end of the spectrum, the require-
ments of Maryland,' Massachusetts," 5 and Virginia38 that the act be re-
ported to the police within forty-eight hours.
Ohio 1' requires that the report be made within seventy-two hours un-
less it is determined that good cause existed for failure to do so.
There are also varied time units in which a claim must be filed, ranging
from the two year limit of Alaska,"' Illinois,'3 9 Nevada, 1' 0 and Wiscon-
sin" down to Michigan's"'2 limit of thirty days after the commission of the
crime or ninety days after the death resulting from the crime.
The biggest difference among the states besides the length of time al-
lowed for filing the claim is whether an extension may be allowed for good
cause shown or whether the limitation is absolute. The language of the Alas-
ka" 3 statute is absolute, whereas the Illinois"' statute, allowing the same
length of time, also permits extension of time for good cause shown provided
notice of intent to file a claim is filed within six months of the injury. Statutes
such as the Maryland" ' provision, allowing 180 days from the injury or
death, or the New York"61 statute, allowing one year, both permit extension
for good cause shown, though both limit the extension time to two years. The
Tennessee" ' statute places no limit on the extension allowed.
Ohio 8 provides a one-year statute of limitations with no provision for
an extension. It has been ruled, in In Re Application of Janice E. and
Katherine Powers,"9 that the provision is an absolute bar against claims not
13 2HAW. REV. STAT. § 351-31(a) (1976).
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-18 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
'
3 4 MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 12 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978).
135 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 5 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
23 6 VA. CODE § 19.2-368.10 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1979).
'7 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.60 (Page Supp. 1978).
Is8 ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.130 (Michie 1974).
23 9 CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION ACT § 3, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 73(g) (West Supp.
1978).
"40NEv. REv. STAT. § 217.210 (1977).
141 WiS. STAT. ANN. § 949.08 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
142 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.355, sec. 5(2) (West Supp. 1967-1979).
148 ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.130 (Michie 1974).
144 Crime Victims Compensation Act § 3, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 73(g) (West Supp.
1978).
'145 MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 6 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1978).
146 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 625(2) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1978).
2"7TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3508(a) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1978).
148 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2743.56(A), 2743.60 (Page Supp. 1978).
149 In re Application of Janice E. and Katherine Powers, Claim No. V77-0197 and Claim No.
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timely filed: "The court is mindful that the result reached herein may seem
harsh .... This court, however, cannot substitute its judgment for that of
the general assembly, so clearly expressed in R.C. 2743.60. Relief for these
claimants must come, if at all, from the general assembly."' 50 It seems that
a two-year limitation might be more realistic in view of the severe
trauma sometimes suffered by victims, involving long hospitalization
and rehabilitation.
None of the statutes requires arrest and conviction of the perpetrator
of the criminally injurious conduct. As in Ohio, 5' the body to which the
claim is made makes its own determination as to whether the conduct oc-
curred. The Ohio statute52 sets up a preponderance of the evidence as the
standard of proof and allows awards for injuries resulting from con-
duct that could not result in criminal conviction because the per-
son engaging in the conduct lacked the capacity to commit a crime
under the laws of the state. 55
The California, 5" Minnesota,'55 North Dakota5 6 and Tennessee 5 ' laws
also specify a preponderance of the evidence as the standard for deciding
whether the requirements for an award have been met. It would seem that
specifying the standard of proof is a good provision, since if the awards be-
come too great an expense for the state, there might be a tendency to limit
the number of awards by requiring a higher standard of proof.
Some states, notably Michigan," New York,"5 9 Pennsylvania,' Ten-
nessee,' 61 and Washington,' specifically provide that acquittal of the al-
leged perpetrator in a criminal prosecution is no bar to compensation of
the victim.
D. Financing
The programs are financed in various ways in different states. Ohio'
provides that the court impose three dollars in additional costs on any per-
150 Id.
151 OrIo REv. STAT. ANN. § 2743.52 (Page Supp. 1978).
152 d.
153 Id. § 2743.51(C).
254 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13964 (West Cun. Supp. 1979).
155 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299B.03, sec. I (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
156 N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-13-04 (Smith Supp. 1977).
15 7 TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3509(b) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1978).
258 MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 18.356, sec. 6(3) (West Supp. 1967-1979).
159 N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 627(3) (McKinney 1972).
160 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 180-7.6(c) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
618 TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3509(c) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1978).
162 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.68.020(2) (a) (West Supp. 1978).
163 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.70 (Page Supp. 1978).
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son who pleads guilty or is convicted of any offense except a non-moving
traffic violation, such monies to go into a reparation special account.
Some states, such as Alaska, have no provision in the act for raising
funds. California provides that a person convicted of a crime of violence
resulting in death or injury to another person can be fined any amount from
ten dollars to $10,000, and additionally provides that a person convicted
of a felony must pay ten dollars additional court costs and, of a misdemean-
or, five dollars additional costs. Michigan'65 provides that the sentencing of
a felon convicted of a crime resulting in death or injury may include the
requirement that he reimburse the state for costs of any compensation given
to his victim. These provisions are representative of the way the financing
is handled among the states.
E. Powers of the Court
In Ohio privileges, except those arising from the attorney-client rela-
tionship, are not recognized regarding communications or records that are
relevant to the physical, mental or emotional condition of the claimant or
victim in a proceeding under the act in which the condition is an element. 6
A single commissioner or panel of commissioners may, for good cause
shown and upon notice to the claimant or victim and to the Attorney Gen-
eral, order the victim or claimant to submit to a mental or psychological
examination." 7 Under similar provisions, an autopsy can be ordered of a
deceased victim.' Written reports of such examinations are to be filed with
the Court of Claims. 6
The only sanction for refusal to comply with such an order, or any
order under the act is a denial of the claim, since the contempt sanction is
not available for such refusal. 7 Interestingly enough, the unavailability of
the contempt sanction applies also to the provision'' requesting the police
to notify victims of crimes of the possibility of claiming under the act. 7
F. Generating Public Awareness
One of the most important provisions of the statutes is the one provid-
ing for notification of the victim that this kind of assistance is available.
Some states, for example, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Nevada, New Jersey and Tennessee have no provision for so inform-
164 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13967 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
165 MICH. Com'. LAWS ANN. § 18.362 (West Supp. 1967-1979).
IGO Id. § 2743.62(A).
167 Id. § 2743.62(B).
268 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. § 2743.63.
171Id. § 2743.71.
17
2 See note 181 infra. and accompanying text.
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ing the victim. Alaska 3 and California"" both provide that notices be post-
ed in hospital emergency rooms with information regarding the compensa-
tion and also require that law enforcement agencies investigating crimes in-
volving eligible victims both inform them and give them appropriate forms,
while other states such as Minnesota.. and Wisconsin""8 simply provide that
the law enforcement agencies give the forms to eligible victims. North Da-
kota, 77 Michigan, 78 Minnesota,7 and Pennsylvania'"0 charge the board
which administers the act with publicizing it.
Ohio has several statutes dealing with this matter. One T8 requires that
any law enforcement agency investigating an offense committed in the state
shall provide information to the victim and his dependents about the avail-
ability of the award and tell them where to obtain an application.
No requirement is made as to how the law enforcement agency is to
do this, and police departments in the state are handling the matter in dif-
ferent ways. Dayton'82 has a pamphlet, entitled "The Crime Victim's Pro-
cedural Guide" which is handed to victims by the investigating officer. In-
cluded in the pamphlet is the information that state compensation is avail-
able and telling the victim how to apply for it. Columbus 8' has issued an
information order to police personnel outlining the provisions of the act and
provides officers with a form to give to the victim, informing him that he
may be entitled to compensation under the act. Cleveland'" has also issued
a General Police Order informing officers of their obligation and provides
the officers with a form to give to the victim. Toledo8 ' has a similar infor-
mational form to be handed to persons who might qualify under the act.
There is also a pamphlet available from the Attorney General's office en-
titled "Are you an innocent victim of a violent crime?" outlining the pro-
visions of the act and informing victims of the method of applying for comp-
ensation. The question, of course, is whether, in the process of investigating
such a crime the officer always remembers to hand out the form, and whe-
173 ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.175 (Michie 1974).
174 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 13968(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
175 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299B.15 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
176 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.04 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
177 N.D. CENT. CODE § 63-15-05 (Smith Supp. 1977).
L7 8 MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.353, sec. 3(j) (West Supp. 1967-1979).
179 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299B.06(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
180 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 180-7.1(k) (Purdon Cune. Supp. 1979-1980).
181 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.71 (Page Supp. 1978).
182 Available from Beverly F. Pickett, Procedural Analyst, Policy Bureau, Department of
Police, Dayton, Ohio.
183 Available from Captain Ernest B. Laszlo, Community Relations Bureau, Division of
Police, Columbus, Ohio.
184 Available from James E. White, Sergeant, Coordinator, Major Offense Bureau, Police
Department, Cleveland, Ohio.
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ther this provision places another burden on officers already overburdened
with paperwork.
The other three Ohio statutes 8 ' require judges to notify victims of de-
linquent acts-at the time of imposing sentence in the case of an adult, or
at a hearing at which a child is adjudicated delinquent-of their right to
file a reparations application. Again the statutes do not mandate any method
of fulfilling this obligation. This, again, seems to be a substantial weakness
in the act.
III. PROCEDURE FOR APPLYING IN OHIO
What is the procedure in Ohio when a person has been informed and
thinks he might be eligible for an award of reparations? No effort will be
made to compare the Ohio procedure with that of other states, since each
state handles the awards in a manner consistent with the type of administra-
tive body that processes the claims. In Ohio, the first step is for the victim
to obtain an application form. 8 The forms are available from the Clerk of
the Court of Claims or from the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas in
the county of the victim's residence. When the form is completed, it is filed
either with the Court of Claims or the Court of Common Pleas in the county
of the victim's residence. 8 There is a filing fee of seven dollars and fifty
cents which may be waived if the victim files an affidavit of indigence, with
the provision that the fee will be determined from any award that is made.'89
If the application is filed with the Court of Common Pleas ten days is
allowed for its transmission to the Court of Claims. 9 The application is
then sent to the Attorney General, who investigates the claim and makes
written findings of fact and recommendations concerning an award of rep-
arations.' This must be filed with the Clerk of the Court of Claims within
sixty days, although an extension may be granted for good cause shown. 9"
The recommendations of the Attorney General are transmitted by the Clerk
of the Court of Claims to the claimant, who has an opportunity to respond
in writing within ten days. 98
By the terms of the act, a board of at least three Court of Claims
Commissioners has been established, all of whom must be attorneys. "' One
member of the Board of Commissioners hears and makes a determination
188 Omo REV. CODE ANN. H9 2929.12(G), 2929.22(G), 2151.355(C) (Page Supp. 1978).
187 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.56 (Page Supp. 1978).
188 id.
189 Id. § 2743.57(B).
190 Id. at (C); OHio R. Civ. P. 6(E).
'9' OHio REV. CODE ANN. H3 2743.58, 2743.59 (Page Supp. 1978).
192 Id. § 2743.59.
'931d. H§ 2743.58(B), 2743.55(C).
'1 Id. § 2743.54.
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of the award;.. 5 if the claimant or the Attorney General objects within ten
days, then the claim will be heard by a panel of three commissioners, who
make the award by a majority vote.'96 If there is no timely objection, the
award is final at this stage. The applicant may appeal to the Court of Claims
the award, the amount of the award, or denial of an award by the panel;
the Attorney General may appeal the conclusions of law.' The decision of
the Court of Claims is final; no further appeals are allowed.'
The award may be made in either a lump sum or installments.9 9 Also,
there is a provision that if a criminal prosecution is pending, the commis-
sioners may, at the request of the Attorney General, suspend the proceed-
ings, but in that case a tentative award may be made to the applicant.'
IV. Two YEARS OF EXPERIENCE
The act has been operative since December, 1976. From December 28,
1976 to June 30, 1977, 706 cases were filed, 194 determined. A total of
$106,058.98 was awarded in 84 cases, with an average award of $1,262.60.
Interestingly, only one order was made for an attorney's fee, and that was
for $200. From July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1978, 1,187 cases were filed, 656
determined, with a total of $1,242,753.09 awarded in 421 cases, an average
of $2,951.91 per award. Attorneys' fees for this period totaled $26,913.69
for 92 orders, an average of $292.54 per order. From July 1, 1978 to March
16, 1979, 875 cases were filed, 695 cases determined and 474 awards
made for a total of $2,399,771.45 or an average award of $5,062.81. A
total of $46,613.71 was ordered for 134 attorneys' fees, an award of $347.-
86 per order. The program totals to March 16, 1979, are: 2,767 cases filed,
1,545 cases determined, 979 awards for a total of $3,748,583.52, an aver-
age award of $3,828.99. Total attorneys' fees are $73,726.90 for 227 or-
ders, an average of $324.79 per order. Obviously, the average amount of
both the awards and the attorneys' fees has been rising, though there has not
been a significant rise in the number of cases filed or in the number of
awards given.20'
In the period from December 28, 1976 to June 30, 1978, there were
a total of 1,893 cases filed.2"2 In the year 1977, the FBI CRIME REPORTS
totals for murder, negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, and aggravated as-
195 Id. § 2743.55(C).
196 Id.
'
97 ld. § 2743.61(A).
198 Id. § 2743.20: "The decision of the Court of Claims with respect to an appeal from a
decision of the Court of Claims commissioners is final, and no appeal from the decision of
the Court of Claims lies to any other court."
199 Id. § 2743.66.
200 Id. §§ 2743.64, 2743.67.
201 Court of Claims of Ohio, Summary of Victims Division Activity from December 28,
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sault in Ohio were 23,135.08 Even assuming that some of the victims of
these crimes would not be eligible for an award of reparations under the act,
the wide disparity in the figures indicates that the law is far from being
utilized to its maximum potential.
At least two factors seem to contribute. The first is the general absence
of public awareness of the availability of the awards due to the lack of
specificity in the provisions for informing the public.2s ' Setting up a more
definite mechanism whereby law enforcement officers and judges will notify
potential victims, providing for notices to be posted in hospitals, and charg-
ing the Attorney General's office with a positive duty to publicize the act
might be some ways to remedy this shortcoming. The other factor is the
tremendous amount of work involved in applying for an award in com-
parison with the low average order for attorneys' fees. Merely filling in the
application would take enough of an attorney's time to reach the amount of
the average fee. Gathering the rest of the information that may be requested
under the act' °5 and representing the client in hearings makes the work in
essence pro bono for the attorney, particularly since the attorney cannot
contract for or receive any larger amount than is allowed as part
of the order.'"
Two years, of course, is not a long enough time to assess the impact
of the act. It will be interesting to watch the development of reparations to
victims of crime in the State of Ohio in coming years.
CATHRINE PETRAGLIA
203 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STAT.S-1977, at 50 (1978).
204 See note 181 supra and accompanying text.
205 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.56(10) (Page Supp. 1978).
208 Id. § 2743.65 (A).
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STEPS TO RECEIPT OF WARRANT
(Minimum Times: Non-Death Claims*)
Step Total
(Days) Days
i) Filed by Applicant in Common Pleas Court 0 0
ii) Transmitted by Common Pleas Court 10 10
to Court of Claims (7+3 days) (2743.57(C))
1) Filed by Applicant in Court of Claims** - -
(or Received from CP Court) (2743.56)
2) Application Served upon Attorney General 3 13
(2743.58)
3) Investigation by Attorney General 60 73
(2743.59)
4) Finding & Recommendation Filed 0 73
by Attorney General (2743.59)
5) Recommendation Served upon Applicant 3 76
(2743.58(B))
6) Time for Applicant to "Respond" to Recommendation 17 93
(2743.58(B) & Order of Court)
7) Assigned to Commissioner for Determination; 30 123
Commissioner's Decision Journalized
(2743.58(B))
8) Commissioner's Decision Served upon 3 126
Applicant & Attorney General
(2743.55(C))
9) Time for Applicant or Attorney General 19 145
to "Appeal" Commissioner's Decision
(2743.55(C))
(19 days actual time for return of Certified
Mail Service by U.S. Postal Service)
IF NO APPEAL & APPEAL TIME HAS ACTUALLY EXPIRED, THEN:
10) Clerk Serves Certified Copy of Judgment upon
Auditor and Office of Budget & Management (OBM)
(2743.191)
11) OBM Certifies Sufficient Monies to Pay -
Judgment (2743.191)
12) Clerk Serves "Directive to Issue Warrant" - -
(Modified Voucher) upon Auditor
(Auditor)
13) Auditor Issues Warrant to Court of Claims
(Auditor)
14) Warrant Sent to Applicant by Certified Mail
15) Warrant Received by Applicant - -
- Steps 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 actually
take an average of 65 days, and are 65 210
largely outside the control of the Court.
Total Days 210
TOTAL TIME (7 Months)
* Death Claims: Add zero to 12 months to total for Dependent Class to close.
** Subtract 10 days from total if application is
filed by applicant directly with Court of Claims.
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* The "Appellant" usually is the Applicant and the "Appellee" usually is
the Attorney General, but the roles may be reversed.
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